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Stigler and Fukuyama: Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq

Montaperto keenly states China’s overarching political dilemma as: “How does
a rising nation committed to achieving
reunification and a world class level of
economic development so order its external relations that it is able to achieve
its objectives and not provoke the opposition of a suspicious great power
that possesses overwhelming comprehensive national power?” Four particular
issues are claimed as critical in defining
the evolving character of the ChinaU.S. relationship: counterterrorism,
Taiwan, participation in international
and multilateral organizations, and
proliferation and arms control. Arguably, this short list should include missile defense, which strikes directly at the
credibility of China’s deterrent, in turn
striking at U.S. freedom of action, U.S.
intentions vis-à-vis China, and the nature of the bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, Montaperto makes the most
salient point in the chapter when he
concludes that both the Taiwan issue
and the future character of the U.S. nuclear posture (including missile defense) strike directly at Chinese vital
interests. On these matters, Montaperto
claims, Beijing will not compromise,
putting these two issues in a transcendent category of their own in the bilateral relationship.
With characteristic clarity, Brad Roberts
outlines both the broad paths open to
China’s nuclear force over the coming
decades and identifies the external and
internal factors that will drive the decision making in choosing what Beijing
calculates is the appropriate path. This
chapter is perhaps the best in the book,
giving the most accurate assessments regarding the current shape of the Chinese
force, as well as the motivators and challenges to its evolution and maturation.
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Roberts makes the good point that regardless of external stimuli, such as U.S.
development of missile defense, the
Chinese force will modernize along a
certain predictable baseline. Beyond
that baseline, the greatest driver to the
size and character of China’s future nuclear force will be the exact character of
the coevolving U.S. national missile
defense architecture. Since that architecture’s final shape is uncertain, so is,
to a large extent, the final shape of
China’s nuclear force.
Finally, Roberts lays out three broad
paths along which the Chinese nuclear
force may evolve: one defined largely by
modernization and incremental response to U.S. missile defense, another
in which China “sprints” to a window
of maximum strategic leverage (particularly with an eye to a Taiwan conflict)
vis-à-vis the not-yet-fully-mature “new
triad” of the 2003 Nuclear Posture Review, and a third that would posture
China for Eurasian nuclear superiority
and avoid any near-term competition
with the United States. Roberts concludes by offering a bit of very penetrating advice on dissuasion: a prudent
course for the United States, especially
with respect to missile defense, might
be characterized by some amount of
transparent restraint, attempting in the
process to engender reciprocal restraint
by China in its nuclear force evolution.
CHRISTOPHER YEAW

Naval War College
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Given that Francis Fukuyama publicly
retracted his support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is not surprising that his
edited volume Nation-Building: Beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq should be generally critical of America’s reconstruction
efforts in those two countries. Still,
readers of every perspective will find
this volume a collection of well informed and insightful critiques of the
American-led efforts at nation building
in both countries, one that offers numerous useful caveats for the future.
Minxin Pei, Samia Amin, and Seth Garz
offer an overview of the profound challenges of nation building. The record is
not encouraging. For the fifteen reconstruction efforts America has concluded
since 1989, a full eleven have failed to
establish and sustain democratic governments. Based on their analysis, the oftencited examples of Japan and Germany are
not representative.
Also, institutional shortcomings abound
in the U.S. government. Michèle
Flournoy observes that, outside the military, the U.S. government lacks a systematized effort to identify lessons
learned from past experiences. Learning
from such failures, while politically
awkward, may be of crucial importance
in the long struggle against terrorism.
Sadly, there are also many institutional
failures. Fukuyama observes that, strikingly, the United States put more effort
into preparing for oil fires and a refugee
crisis for the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
largely because these were the challenges that arose during the 1991 liberation of Kuwait.
One unfortunate aspect of the book’s
organization is the considerable overlap
between the six chapters that focus on
Iraq and Afghanistan. In the three
chapters on Afghanistan, foci more
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readily emerge. S. Fredrick Starr’s discussion of the prelude to international
involvement in Afghanistan, Marvin
Weinbaum’s assessment of the social
impediments to reconstruction, and
Larry Goodson’s treatment of provincial reconstruction teams are all distinctive contributions.
The chapters on Iraq, however, are
more vulnerable in this regard. There is
certainly virtue in having three knowledgeable authors—Larry Diamond,
Johanna Mendelson Forman, and James
Dobbins—opine on all aspects of these
occupations. However, when one reads
for the third time that disbanding the
Iraqi army was a serious mistake, the revelation has by then lost some of its punch.
Diamond’s piece on Iraq, though critical
of the Bush administration, must receive
special consideration, given that Diamond
worked with the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) in early 2004. His criticisms, in particular of the CPA, are often
telling. Still, he argues that many of the
Iraqis he met genuinely crave opportunities for democratic political expression,
and he believes that analysts and politicians who promote the idea of propping
up a benevolent strongman “do not
grasp the divisions and aspirations in
Iraqi society.”
Nation building can be a dangerously
tempting enterprise; the clearly malignant nature of such governments as
Saddam Hussein’s can generate unwarranted optimism regarding a society’s
susceptibility to political reengineering.
As Fukuyama argues, the United States
must be “far more cautious” about how
it engages in such vastly complicated
endeavors.
ANDREW STIGLER

Naval War College
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